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India's "Patriot Act": POTA and the
Impact on Civil Liberties in the World's
Largest Democracy
Jayanth K. Krishnan*
Introduction
Following the September 11th attacks in the United States,
President Bush signed into law what has become known as the
USA PATRIOT Act.1 Viewed as an important weapon in the fight
against terrorism, the PATRIOT Act, according to some, has
sought to curb and prevent future terrorist acts by expanding the
federal government's powers. 2 Three months after the New York,
Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania attacks, India-the world's
* Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul,
Minnesota. J.D., Ohio State University; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison.
The author thanks Julia Eckert, Marc Galanter, Clark Cunningham, and Gary
Jacobsohn for their insightful comments. Note the title of this piece, India's
"Patriot Act" is a term that has been occasionally used by some in the media
describing the similarities between India's newest anti-terrorist law and its
counterpart just passed in the United States. For a recent newspaper article
employing this term, see Dan Morrison, India's 'Patriot Act' Comes Under Scrutiny,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 30, 2003, at 7.
1. Uniting and Strengthening of America by Providing Appropriate Tools to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act].
2. Id. See also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2002); infra
Part III (discussing how the federal governmental power has been enhanced as a
result of this act). But there are those who argue that it is an overstatement to
claim that the PATRIOT Act has expanded governmental power. See, e.g., Orrin
S.Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
607 (2003) (arguing that the PATRIOT Act actually places new regulations on the
use of governmental surveillance over the internet). And Kim Lane Scheppelle, a
professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and someone who has
intensely studied the PATRIOT Act, in an open letter to the scholarly "Law and
Courts List-Serve," also recently wrote that "much of what the DOJ [Department of
Justice] is doing in the war on terrorism is not done under the authority of the
PATRIOT Act." Posting of Kim Lane Scheppele, kimlane@law.upenn.edu to
lawcourts-l@usc.edu (Apr. 10, 2004) (on file with author). Scheppele argues that
critics wrongly have summarily labeled much of the government's actions in the
post 9-11 era as being done under the PATRIOT Act, when in fact it has been
private organizations, with informal governmental assistance, that have been the
"more worrisome sources of potential rights violation[s]." Id. Since this Article
does not deal with the debate over the uses of the USA PATRIOT Act, I shall not
delve further on this point.
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largest democracy and a U.S. proclaimed ally in the war on
terrorism-experienced one of its most significant terrorist attacks
to date. 3 On December 13, 2001, five Muslim extremists attacked
the Indian National Parliament, killing seven people and placing
the country into a heightened state of alert. 4 Like its American
counterpart, the Indian central government in March 2002, passed
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), to enhance India's ability
to crack down on possible terrorist threats.5 While the academic.
literature on the PATRIOT Act is growing, little is known about
the extent to which POTA might be affecting civil liberties and
civil rights in India.
This Article seeks to offer an analysis of POTA. Part 16
discusses the key legislative antecedent to POTA, the Terrorist
and Disruptive (Prevention) Activities Act of 1987. 7 Although this
particular statute eventually lapsed, it nevertheless had enormous
influence on the drafters of POTA. Part 118 offers an account of
what led to the emergence of POTA. It outlines the arguments
made on behalf of the legislation, and presents the critics' views of
POTA. Part III 9 explains how many of POTA's provisions
seriously infringe on the civil liberties of Indians, especially in
minority communities. Finally, Part IVlO concentrates on how the
Indian government has used POTA to prosecute terrorist-classified
cases, and how the courts have adjudicated these matters largely
in support of POTA. The Article concludes, as do many dismayed
rights activists, that few checks have been placed on how the
government has exercised its powers under this so-called security-
focused, terrorist- prevention statute.
3. News reports on the attack were extensive. See, e.g., Rediff News Serv., The
Attack on Parliament (2001), at http://www.rediff.com/news/pat2001.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2004); Rahul Bedi, 12 Die on Raid on Indian Parliament,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/12/14/windl4.xml;
The Indian national newspaper, The Hindu, dedicated its December 14, 2001,
edition to the attacks. HINDU, Dec. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/12/14.
4. See supra note 3.
5. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS [hereinafter POTA].
6. See infra notes 12-24.
7. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 74 A.I.R. 1987 ACTS
[hereinafter TADA].
8. See infra notes 25-55.
9. See infra notes 56-155.
10. See infra notes 156-239.
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I. An Important Predecessor to POTA-TADA
POTA did not emerge onto the Indian political landscape in a
statutory vacuum. Some fifteen years prior to its enactment, the
Indian Parliament passed the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, or TADA.12 TADA came into law partly as a
response to the death of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who was
assassinated by militant Sikh extremists in 1984.13 Indira's son,
Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother as prime minister, also
supported the new anti-terrorist legislation because various
militant groups in the east, north, and south of India were
engaging in on-going guerrilla-style attacks against the Indian
state.14
TADA's provisions expanded the central government's powers
to deal with individuals that the statute classified as terrorists.
1 5
For example, at a judge's discretion, trials of accused terrorists
could be held in camera.16 Furthermore, section 21 of the Act
presumed that suspected terrorists were guilty and needed to
11. TADA, 74 A.I.R. 1987 ACTS.
12. Id. Anti-terrorist legislation, though, dates back to the days of the British
Raj. In 1919 Britain enacted the Rowlatt Act, which permitted the Raj to
summarily jail those who were deemed as dissenters, antagonists, or agitators
within India. See Mahatma Gandhi and the Story of Indian Independence, at
http://library.thinkquest.org/26523/mainfiles/lifehistorylO.htm?tqskipl--1 (last
visited Mar. 6, 2004). That same year, Mohandas Gandhi led a mass wave of
protests to denounce this law as being in violation of due process and fundamental
human rights. Id. In post-independence times, the Indian government has enacted
other anti-terrorist laws. Consider, for example, the Armed Forces (Jammu and
Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 77 A.I.R. 1990 ACTS; the National Security (Second
Amendment) Act, 72 A.I.R. 1984 ACTS; the National Security Act, 68 A.I.R. 1980
ACTS; the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 54 A.I.R. 1967 ACTS; and the
Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act, 45 A.I.R. 1958 ACTS.
13. See R. Shunmugasundaram, Can POTA Achieve what TADA could not?
HINDU, Jan. 2, 2002, available at
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/op/2002/01/01/stories/2002010100150100.htm
(discussing the original reasons behind the development of TADA including the
assassination of Indira Gandhi).
14. See K. Balagopal, Law Commission's View of Terrorism, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., June 17, 2000, at 2114; TADA- Hard Law for Soft State, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., Mar. 25, 2000, at 1066 (containing an edited version of People's Union of
Democratic Rights Report) [hereinafter Hard Law]. See generally SANJIB BARUAH,
INDIA AGAINST ITSELF: AsSAM AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONALITY (1999) (discussing
the historical origins of TADA and how it was designed to defend against the
mafias and gangs that filled the country).
15. See TADA, 74 A.I.R. 1987 ACTS, Part II, § 3 (providing for the punishment of
terrorist acts). This statute's definition is similar to that used by the POTA statute,
which will be discussed below. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
16. TADA, 74 A.I.R. 1987 ACTS, Part III, §§ 16(1)-(3); see also id. at Part III, §§
19(1)-(3) (discussing the appeals process for suspected terrorists).
Law and Inequality [Vol. 22:265
establish their innocence. 17 Also, the state could arrest anyone on
the mere suspicion that the person was engaging in terrorist
activities, and keep the accused behind bars for up to a year
without bail.18  Once on trial, a defendant did not have an
automatic right to face his accusers in court. 19
For many, TADA's enhancement of the state's power to deal
with those it believed threatened India's national security stirred
up memories of the Emergency Rule era. During this nearly two-
year period from 1975 to 1977, Indira Gandhi suspended the
democratic constitution, jailed thousands of her opponents, and
ruled by decree, arguing that the state faced a national security
threat from opposition forces both inside and outside of the
country.20 Civil liberties advocates who opposed TADA warned
that if the government's powers were not kept in check, democracy
in India could once again be in jeopardy. 21 By 1994, over 76,000
people had been arrested under TADA, with only about one
percent of these detainees ever being convicted of any crime.22
TADA, however, died in 1995, when public pressure forced
Parliament not to reenact it at its two year required renewal
date.23 However, the shadow of TADA continues to loom for two
reasons. First, even though TADA is no longer in effect, the state
retains the power to charge suspected persons retroactively for
17. Id. at Part IV, § 21.
18. Id. at Part IV, § 20(4).
19. Id.
20. Grassroots activists remained skeptical; they cited several self-interested
factors that caused her to suspend the Constitution. The economy was weak, the
public disapproved her policies, leading to opposition leaders calling on military to
oust her from power. She was eventually convicted of corruption charges in a state
court in Gujarat. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy and the Role of
the Courts in India, 21 AM. ASIAN REV. 91, 93 (2003); see also PAUL BRASS, THE
POLITICS OF INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 96-99 (1994) (discussing the Emergency
Rule era that was developed by Indira Gandhi).
21. See Balagopal, supra note 14, at 2117-22 (discussing TADA's threats to
India's national security and civil liberties); see also Susan D. Susman, Distant
Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest
Litigation, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 57, 100 n.226 (1994) (discussing Balagopal's article
and the fact that there was indeed worry on the part of civil liberties activists).
22. See Hard Law, supra note 14, at 1. The data from this report state that one
percent of those arrested were convicted, yet data from the Sikh Human Rights
Group note that 1.8% were convicted. See SIKH HUM. RTS. GROUP, TERRORIST AND
DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT 1987, at
http://www.shrg.org/information/tada/tada.htm# (last visited Feb. 24, 2004);
compare S.U. Rahman, TADA. A Ghost Best Forgotten, MILLI GAZETTE, Nov. 6,
2003, available at http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15112001/17.htm (noting
that under TADA 77,000 were arrested, 8,000 were tried, 725 were convicted, and
3,000 remain jailed to this day).
23. See Balagopal, supra note 14, at 2114.
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crimes committed during its enactment. Second, the Indian
Supreme Court, in 1994, legitimized the statute by holding
constitutional one of its central provisions, which allowed courts to
admit into evidence uncorroborated witness statements gathered
by the police. 24 Because of the longstanding tradition, arising from
a historic and widespread public distrust of the police, prohibiting
the admissibility of this type of evidence, the Court's ruling came
as a surprise. Many observers began to wonder (and worry) if the
Executive Branch would push for legislation further enhancing the
powers of the police. In the years that followed, these concerns
would turn out to be well justified.
II. The Post-TADA Era: The Emergence of POTO-then
POTA
Despite the suspension of TADA, government officials
continued to seek ways to increase the state's anti-terrorism
powers. The same year that TADA was suspended, the central
government's Law Commission proposed the Criminal Law
Amendment Bill (CLAB), an initiative that contained many
provisions identical to those found in TADA.25 While CLAB never
became law, it came before Parliament on repeated occasions. 26
In 2000, the government replaced this bill with the
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO), a proposal more
sweeping in many ways than either CLAB or TADA.27
Government officials who sponsored POTO offered a detailed set of
explanations justifying its necessity. 28 Members of the Muslim
underworld had set off deadly bomb blasts in Bombay in 1993,
which made national headlines. 29 A few years later the Muslim
24. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569.
25. Guatam Navlakha, POTO: Taking the Lawless Road, ECON. & POL. WKLY.,
Dec. 8, 2001, at 4520.
26. Id.
27. See POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS. POTA is the act that resulted from the
POTO proposal.
28. See generally Joint Sitting of the Houses of Parliament, Synopsis of Debates,
Mar. 26, 2002, at http://164.100.24.208Jls/lsdeb/ls13/ses9/260302.html (last visited
Mar. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Debates].
29. According to Dr. Julia Eckert, a scholar of South Asian studies at the Max
Planck Institute in Germany and an expert in Bombay politics, the bomb blasts
actually were revenge attacks. Letter from Dr. Julia Eckert to Jayanth K.
Krishnan (Dec. 9, 2003) (on file with the author). On December 6, 1992, the famous
Babri Mosque in Ayodhya was destroyed by Hindu nationalists. Id. The following
day riots resulted throughout the country, particularly in Bombay, and lasted
nearly three weeks; approximately 2000 Muslims were killed. Id. Subsequently,
on January 9, 1993, Hindu-nationalists, led by the Shiv Sena organization, engaged
in a pogrom in Bombay; Shiv Sena leaders argued that they were protesting the
2004]
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extremist organization al-Umma killed a group of people (mainly
Hindus) in the southern city of Coimbature.30 In addition, the
Indian government accused Muslim terrorists of participating in
atrocities in places such as Kashmir, Bihar, and the Telegana
region. 31 In the eastern part of the country-Tripura, Bodoland,
and Assam-separatist militants seeking independence from India
were suspected of receiving military and financial support from
Muslim contingents. 32
Tension between India and Pakistan had also reached new
heights by 1998, with both countries displaying to the world their
nuclear capabilities.3 3 By 2000, government officials were well
equipped with enough examples to argue that an aggressive new
law was needed to deal with this rising Muslim militancy. India's
democratic political system, government officials warned, was
being challenged and the state required enhanced authority to
meet this threat.
The leading advocates in favor of POTO included Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Home Minister L.K. Advani,
both of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).34 Yet political opponents
initially were able to block POTO's passage into law, having
successfully argued that the bill would crack down on Muslims
while leaving Hindu extremists to engage in violent acts free from
the ordinance's liability.35 Muslim interest groups and political
parties, in particular, argued that the government had ignored the
Hindu-committed atrocities that had occurred in cities such as
Ayodhya, New Delhi, Bombay, as well as in other regions of the
killing of a Hindu-family by Muslim extremists. Id. Then came the above-
mentioned March 13, 1993 Bombay bomb blasts. Id. See also JULIA ECKERT, THE
CHARISMA OF DIRECT ACTION: POWER, POLITICS AND THE SHIV SENA 113 (2003).
30. Letter from Dr. Julia Eckert to Jayanth K. Krishnan (Dec. 9, 2003) (on file
with the author); see also, T.S. Subramanian, Death Sentence for Al Umma Cadre,
FRONTLINE, Jan. 18-31 2003,
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2001/stories/20030117007113000.htm.
31. Balagopal, supra note 14, at 2115-16.
32. Id.
33. See generally DINSHAW MISTRY, CONTAINING MISSILE PROLIFERATION 109-
127 (2003); GEORGE PETROVICH, INDIA'S NUCLEAR BOMB: THE IMPACT ON GLOBAL
PROLIFERATION (1999); SUMANTRA ROSE, KASHMIR: ROOTS OF CONFLICT, PATHS TO
PEACE (2003) (discussing the nuclear proliferation of India and Pakistan).
34. See Debates supra note 28 (statements of Shri L.K. Advani, Minister of Home
Affairs, and Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister).
35. See Smita Narula, Overlooked Danger: The Security and Rights Implications
of Hindu Nationalism in India, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 41, 57, 58 n.63 (2003)
(describing POTA as "long debated" and noting that "such laws have been used to
subject minorities and political opponents to arbitrary arrest, preventive detention,
torture, and death in custody").
[Vol. 22:265
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country. 36 Furthermore, opponents feared that if POTO passed,
mass arrests of Muslims would ensue, as was the case under
TADA. Between 1987 and 1995, when TADA was in effect, eighty
percent of people detained in such states as Rajasthan,
Maharashtra, and Gujarat were Muslim. 37
Although the BJP was unable to gather the requisite political
support to pass POTO, the December 2001 attack on Parliament
by Muslim extremists gave the party the fuel it needed to restart
the debate. The government argued that existing anti-terrorism
laws had failed to deter militants from threatening "the epitome of
Indian democracy." 38 According to the government, the number of
Indians killed by Pakistani-backed terrorists since 1989 had
reached 61,000. 39 A real threat was present, and substantive
measures were needed in order to crush these anti-democratic
forces. 40 In his floor speech supporting the passage of POTO,
Home Minister Advani conceded that TADA had been an
ineffective statute that had been misused by government officials.
But he promised: "POTO is different than TADA." 41
Although the Supreme Court had provided legitimacy for
TADA, Advani was quick to point out that the Court had also
recommended how the police ought to conduct their
investigations-and, according to Advani, these recommendations
were incorporated into the new bill.42 For example, under POTO,
defendants could invoke the right to silence, and police had to
provide warnings that anything defendants said in the course of
the interrogation could be used in court against them. 43 Moreover,
POTO explicitly barred the police from using coercion in order to
obtain a statement from an individual. 44 The state could punish
any police official found abusing this authority with a fine and up
36. Balagopal, supra note 14, at 2119 (providing statistics of Muslim arrests).
37. See Rahman, supra note 22; but see Letter from Dr. Julia Eckert to Jayanth
K. Krishnan, supra note 29. Dr. Eckert disputes Rahman's statistics, particularly
with regard to union and labor leaders, noting how many Hindus were indeed
arrested under TADA. Id.
38. Debates, supra note 28 (statement of the Deputy-Speaker) (mourning the
lives lost on December 13, 2001 during the attack by Muslim extremists).
39. Id. (statement of Home Minister L.K. Advani).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 32(2). The "A" in POTA, refers to the word
"Act." The final "0" in POTO refers to the word "Ordinance" or proposed bill that
had yet to be enacted. The sections cited here will be the sections of the Act.
44. Id. § 32(3).
20041
Law and Inequality
to two years in prison. 45  POTO also assured defendants a
statutory right to appeal a criminal conviction to a state High
Court.46 For these reasons, both Advani and Prime Minister
Vajpayee promised that POTO could effectively combat terrorism
while protecting defendants' rights to due process and a fair trial.
On March 28, 2002, POTO, the proposed ordinance, became
POTA the statutory act. Opponents to the legislation decried the
manner in which POTA had been enacted. Normally, for a bill to
become law in India, it must receive a simple majority vote in each
house of Parliament. 47 Although POTO gained the required
support in the lower house, the Lok Sabha, it did not garner the
necessary votes in the upper house, the Rajya Sabha. However, a
technical procedure allows the ruling government to call on both
houses to meet together and vote on a bill in a joint session; in this
situation only a simple majority of the entire Parliament is needed
to pass the bill.48 Such a maneuver is rarely used and is viewed by
many as subverting the independence afforded to each house
under the Constitution.49 In fact, Sonia Gandhi, 50 the current
leader of the Congress Party, the main opposition party in
Parliament, noted in her floor speech before the ordinance became
law:
This is a historic occasion. It is only the third time in more
than a half a century of parliamentary life that both the
Houses have been convened together in this manner .... This
is an attempt to intimidate the Houses with arithmetic
superiority and to reduce them both to rubber stamps.
Joint-session is an extraordinary provision. For an issue such
as POTO, a Joint Session can never be a satisfactory solution.
It is, even more unacceptable when it is used to pass a
draconian law in the backdrop of [religious] communal
tension.51
45. Id. § 58.
46. Id. § 34.
47. See Atul Kobli, India, in INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS 214-87
(Mark Kesselman et al. eds., 2000).
48. Id. See also Jayanth K. Krishnan, New Politics, Public Interest Groups, and
Legal Strategies in the United States and Beyond (2001) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with author).
49. See, e.g., Debates, supra note 28 (statement of Sonia Gandhi) (noting that
many of her supporters denounced this BJP-led tactic).
50. For those who may be unfamiliar with the Indian political landscape, Sonia
Gandhi is no relation to Mahatma Gandhi. Sonia, an Italian-born naturalized
Indian citizen, is the widow of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Rajiv was the
son of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who herself was the daughter of
India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.
51. Debates, supra note 28 (statement of Sonia Gandhi).
[Vol. 22:265
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Others joined Sonia Gandhi's outrage during the debate on
POTO. Some charged that the BJP was using POTO as a means
of pandering to its Hindu fundamentalist constituency. 52 Others
suggested that POTO was not so much an anti-terrorism measure
but rather a "terrorist law [that would be] . . .used to terrorise
minorities."5 3  Still others worried that the BJP would employ
POTO as a tool to harass or threaten political enemies who
disagreed with government policy.54  These dissenting voices
nevertheless failed to carry the day. In the next Part of this
Article, I examine the new legislation and show how the
government's promise that POTA would "not be misused"55 is in
serious jeopardy of going unfulfilled.
III. The Provisions of POTA
A. Initial Problems with the Statute-Denial of Individual
Freedoms and Rights
POTA's provisions share some ties to the USA PATRIOT Act.
Under the PATRIOT Act, non-citizens legally residing in the
United States who are believed to have even the most tangential
association with suspicious organizations may now be subject to
deportation, indefinite confinement, or permanent imprisonment. 56
The PATRIOT Act permits ideology-based exclusions to those
seeking admission into the United States as well.57 The PATRIOT
52. See, e.g., id. (statement of H.D. Deve Gowda).
53. See, e.g., id. (statement of Mulayam Singh Yadav).
54. See, e.g., id. (statement of Kapil Sibal).
55. See, e.g., id. (statement of Home Minister L.K. Advani).
56. PATRIOT Act, supra note 1, at §§ 411-12. See also Cole, supra note 2, at 966-
69. There is currently an initiative being proposed by Attorney General John
Ashcroft that would expand even further the provisions of the present legislation.
Reports indicate that among "the most troubling section[s] would [be to] strip U.S.
citizenship from anyone who gives 'material support' to any group that the attorney
general designates as a terrorist organization." Jack M. Balkin, A Dreadful Act II,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at B23. Because little is known about this initiative, I
shall, for now, only consider the USA PATRIOT Act itself. For an investigative
journalistic piece that has uncovered what else the PATRIOT II initiative contains,
see Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, Justice Dept. Drafts Sweeping Expansion of
Anti-Terrorism Act: Center Publishes Secret Draft of 'Patriot I' Legislation, Feb. 7,
2003, at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportlD=502&Ll=10&L2=10&L
3=O&L4=O&L5=0. For important Supreme Court cases that have discussed
denationalization, see Vance v. Terrazas, 44 U.S. 252 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
57. PATRIOT Act, supra note 1, at §§ 411-12. As Cole notes, although the
Supreme Court has stated that aliens living outside of the United States have
fewer constitutional protections than those residing within, normatively he believes
20041
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Act also gives law enforcement greater latitude to conduct secret
searches without probable cause, including the allowance of more
intrusive wiretapping.58 And special secret military tribunals
have been established for the purposes of trying suspected
terrorists, exemplifying the point, to some, that individual rights
have been curtailed in this era of heightened security.59
POTA contains similarly troubling features. Provisions exist,
for instance, that chill an individual's freedom to associate with
others. 60  Consider section 3 of POTA, which describes the
"punishment for, and measures for dealing with, terrorist
activities" 61 and criminalizes an individual "who is a member of a
terrorist gang or terrorist organization."62 The statute, however, is
silent as to how the state must prove that a person indeed is part
of such a terrorist organization. 63 In fact, section 20 of POTA
presumes that an individual charged with being a member of a
terrorist organization is a terrorist unless that person can show
that he or she has not participated in terrorist activities and that
the organization itself was not declared illegal by the state at the
time when the person joined.6 4 By placing this type of onus on the
individual, the state inevitably inhibits those peaceful persons who
might wish to join a non-mainstream association but fear that
doing so could subject them to potential arrest, or at the very least
that the power of the First Amendment is reduced by resorting to such practices.
Cole, supra note 2, at 970. For a related discussion, see Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens"
and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons,
28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1996-97).
58. PATRIOT Act, supra note 1, at § 218. See also Cole, supra note 2, at 972-74.
According to Cole such surveillance techniques have resulted in greater ethnic
profiling of certain groups such as Arabs and South Asians. Id. See also Thomas
Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction
of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 37-38 (2002).
59. Cole, supra note 2, at 974-78.
60. AMNESTY INT'L., BRIEFING ON THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ORDINANCE 14
(2001) [hereinafter BRIEFING], available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engASA200492001?Open?Open (last visited
Feb. 24, 2004). In fact, much of the ensuing discussion on POTA's drawbacks is
discussed in this Amnesty report and will be cited accordingly. But as I shall
explain, the Amnesty report, as does a report by Human Rights Watch, gives great
deference to the government's National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)
because of its supposedly critical views on POTA. However, as I will show, the
NHRC has hardly been hawkish in its assessment of POTA.
61. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 3.
62. Id., § 3(5).
63. See BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 14. The list of banned groups is provided in
what is called the Act's "schedule," or appendix. There are to date twenty-five such
organizations listed. Id.
64. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 20(1).
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to the hassle of having to prove their innocence. 65
The heart of the problem is how the statute defines the words
"terrorist," "terrorist acts," and "terrorist activities." Under
section 3, a terrorist act is an act done "with intent to threaten the
unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror
in the people or any section of the people . *.".."66 This section is
supposed to apply to all persons within India, but as various non-
governmental organizations have charged, for years the military
has itself engaged in these exact acts in places such as Kashmir.67
Hindu nationalist groups politically aligned to the BJP-led
government, such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the
Bajrang Dal, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have
also committed terrorist-like atrocities against minorities. 68 And
non-governmental organizations continue to suspect the Indian
police force of participating in a wide range of terrorist-type
activities. 69
The vague definition allows for discriminatory application.
Despite POTA's language that anyone found guilty of a crime
under the law will be punished,70 no military officials, Hindu
nationalists, or police officers to date have been charged under
POTA.71 Section 57 of the Act gives governmental authorities
immunity from prosecution under POTA, as long as the actions
taken to combat terrorism are done in good faith.7 2 Terrorism in
65. For a discussion of this point, see BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 10-11.
66. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 3(1)(a).
67. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, India/Pakistan Summit: Call
to Address Human Rights in Kashmir (July 14, 2001),
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/O7/pakistanO713.htm. See also Press Release,
Amnesty International (Nov. 25, 2002), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200222002?open&of=ENG-IND.
68. Human Rights Watch has published a detailed report illustrating how the
Hindu-right have antagonized minority interests in India. See HUM. RTS. WATCH,
COMPOUNDING INJUSTICE: THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO REDRESS MASSACRES IN
GUJARAT 4 (2003) [hereinafter COMPOUNDING INJUSTICE]. The Indian non-
governmental organization (NGO), People's Union for Civil Liberties, also has
written on this topic and has numerous reports available at www.pucl.org (last
visited Feb. 24, 2004).
69. See COMPOUNDING INJUSTICE, supra note 68, at 27-29. See also S.P. SATHE,
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING AND ENFORCING LIMITS 209-48
(2002).
70. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 1(2).
71. See BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 14; see also Sridhar Krishnaswami, Gujarat
Legal System Biased, HINDU, Feb. 27, 2003, available at
http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu]2003/02/28/stories/2003022802521100.htm;
Special Correspondent, NHRC Fiat to Gujarat on Best Bakery Verdict, HINDU, July
1, 2003, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehinduV2003/07/01/stories/2003070105021100.htm.
72. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 57; see also BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 14.
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the Indian context thus primarily means one thing: Muslim
terrorism.73 Even the preamble of the statute intimates the anti-
Muslim focus by referencing both the devastation of "cross-border
terrorist activities" supported by Pakistan and also by discussing
how the impetus for passing POTA was the December 2001
Muslim attack on Parliament.7 4
POTA's potentially disparate impact on minority
communities could also violate the equal protection principles of
the Indian Constitution. Article 14 of the Constitution reads,
"Itihe State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or
the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."75
Article 15 reiterates this tenet more specifically by prohibiting the
state from discriminating against any citizen on the basis of
"religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them."76
Although much of the litigation involving these two Articles has
dealt with promoting affirmative action-type policies on behalf of
lower castes and women, 77 the preeminent Indian constitutional
law scholar, S.P. Sathe, has noted that the Indian Supreme Court
has explicitly held that the right to equal protection extends to all
state policies. 78 If the Muslim community therefore finds itself
singled out under POTA-as was the case during the TADA era-
the Court may be obliged to consider whether this group's equal
protection rights are being protected.79
73. See, e.g., Debates, supra note 28 (statements of Somnath Chatterjee and
Mulayam Singh Yadav). See also POTA: Well-Founded Fears, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., Apr. 5, 2003, at 1337. Unfortunately, neither the statute nor POTA's
supporters have specifically defined what constitutes good faith.
74. POTA, Statement of Objects and Reasons, 1, 2,
http://www.naavi.org/importantlaws/pota/pota-sch.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
75. INDIA CONST. art. 14.
76. Id. art. 15(1).
77. Article 15(4) specifically gives the state the power to promote policies to
advance societal and educational status of "backward classes of citizens or . ..
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." Id. at art. 15(4). See SATHE, supra
note 69, at 132-39. For a classic treatment of articles 14 and 15, see generally
MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES (1984).
78. See SATHE, supra note 69, at 132-33. For the case law highlighting this
principle, see Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 487; E.P. Royappa v.
State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555; State of Madras v. V.G. Row, A.I.R. 1952
S.C. 196.
79. Interestingly, though, my research of Supreme Court case law on TADA
reveals that the main Article 14 equal protection challenges were not ones in which
Muslims argued that they were singled out. See, e.g., Santhan et al v. State, A.I.R.
1999 S.C 2640 (ruling that Section 15 of TADA, which allowed police to take
confessions through audio recordings, does not violate Article 14 of the
Constitution); Abdul Aziz v. West Bengal, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 3305, 3305-06 (ruling
that classifying certain prisoners as terrorists while classifying others as "ordinary
criminals" is not a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution).
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B. Additional Statutory Complications
1. POTA's Detention Provisions
POTA's detention provisions are equally troubling. Within
India's criminal justice system is a huge number of "under-tried"
detainees whose cases languish for years in the tremendously
clogged courts.80 Economist Bibek Debroy, has noted:
Half a million cases in the High Courts have been on hold for
10 years or more, and almost 1 million in the lower courts.
While the overly long time taken for civil cases to be resolved
can be frustrating to litigants, of much greater concern are
cases that involve incarceration. Two-thirds of the case
backlog involves criminal trials. Today, there are 275,000
people in India's jails; 200,000 of them are waiting for their
day in court. Even more distressing, 72% of the jail population
consists of people accused only of petty crimes. Many have
been locked up awaiting trial for longer than the maximum
sentence for their alleged crime.8 '
POTA's detention provisions exacerbate this pathology.
Under section 49, subdivision 2, for example, the police may place
a suspected terrorist in jail for up to ninety days without any court
proceedings. This period may be extended another three months if
the prosecution submits a report to the court explaining the state's
need for additional time.8 2 When an individual is charged under
POTA, section 49, subdivision 7 permits a denial of bail to the
accused for up to one year, as long as the prosecution's opposition
to the bail request satisfies the court.83 The statute does not
require the prosecution to meet any evidentiary threshold when
making its motion, such as showing whether the accused had the
means, motive, or opportunity to commit the alleged crime.8 4
Furthermore, while the arrestee is guaranteed the right to
consult a lawyer and to have a family member informed of his or
her arrest,8 5 section 52, subdivision 4 curiously states that the
accused is not entitled to have a lawyer "present throughout the
80. See Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy, supra note 20, at 92-93.
81. Bibek Debroy, Losing a World Record, FAR E. ECON., Feb. 14, 2002, at 23.
82. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 49(2). The statute does not provide any factors
for determining when an extension will be granted. See also BRIEFING, supra note
60, at 7-10.
83. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 49(7).
84. Amnesty International has also criticized section 48(9), which per se denies
bail to a non-Indian citizen charged under POTA, as being a direct violation of
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See
BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 10.
85. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS §§ 52(2)-(3).
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period of [the police] interrogation."8 6  Section 14 additionally
states that "any individual" (not excluding defense lawyers) is
obligated to provide to the state information of anyone who may be
in violation of POTA.87 These limitations contravene the spirit of
the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
8 8
(BPRL) in two major ways. First, Article 1 of the BPRL mandates
that clients have access to their lawyers during an entire police
interrogation.8 9 Second, Article 22 of the BPRL emphasizes that
the confidentiality between a lawyer and a client must be
respected by the state; efforts to undermine this relationship are
incompatible with international norms on the rights of the
detained.90
Supporters of POTA may contend that section 52,
subdivisions 4 and 14 are in line with Article 22, sections 4
through 7 of the Indian Constitution, which exempts the state
from providing legal counsel to a person held for "preventive
detention" and implicitly places some limitations on the
confidential relationship between a lawyer and client.9 1 With
respect to the latter point, the Indian Supreme Court recently
noted that lawyers do not have an absolute, "sacrosanct right" to
keep privileged all communications from clients-particularly
those involving POTA-related crimes. 92 But as already stated,
police mistreatment of those under arrest is widespread and well-
known.93 The Court has acknowledged this reality and has
86. Id. § 52(4). See also BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 9.
87. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 14.
88. See generally U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS., BASIC
PRINCIPLES ON THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (1990). For a discussion of this document,
see BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 9.
89. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 88, art. 1.
90. Id. art. 22. As part of its argument, Amnesty International has argued that
in the POTA chapter dealing with the police's right to tap and intercept suspicious
communications, sections 37 and 42 (addressing the issue of "Appointment of
Competent Authority" conducting wiretaps) and section 44 (addressing the issue of
protecting the information once it is collected) should also have explicit safeguards
ensuring that lawyer-client communications must always be protected. BRIEFING,
supra note 60, at 12.
91. INDIA CONST. art. 22(3)-(7).
92. PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of 2002 with W.P. (Crl.) 89
and 129/2002 and 28 and 48/2003. But see, Rakesh Bhatnagar, SC Upholds Pota,
Respite for Vaiko, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 17, 2003, at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/363248.cms.
93. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of India
has been involved in several high-profile police brutality cases. See Tukaram v.
State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 S.C.C. 143, 148-50 (shockingly acquitting police
officers who raped an adolescent girl because the prosecution had failed to show
that the girl had tangibly resisted). See also D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal
(1997) 1 S.C.C. 416, 424 (stating that "Itlhe protection of an individual from torture
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established detailed guidelines to ensure the humane treatment of
people under arrest, 94 including the right of detainees to have
access to legal representation. 95 As several observers have noted,
however, the police have disregarded the Court's admonitions on
repeated occasions 96 and, in particular, continue to deny many
under arrest access to a lawyer. 97 Moreover, because section 32 of
POTA adopts TADA's language in section 15 allowing uncounseled
statements made to police to be used at trial,98 unrepresented
detainees may be coerced into confessing to terrorist acts that they
have not committed.99 Also, because the police can take blood,
DNA, or other bodily samples without consent from the accused, 10 0
the likelihood increases that POTA may be used to continue
ignoring individual civil liberties. 10 1
and abuse by the police and other law-enforcing agencies is a matter of deep
concern" and infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 21 and 22 of
the Indian Constitution); Gudalure M.J. Cherian v. India (1992) 1 S.C.C. 397
(ordering the Uttar Pradesh state government to pay money damages to a group of
nuns who were raped after the police and the CBI mishandled the investigation);
Vishal Jeet v. India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1412, 1416 (ordering state governments to
direct law enforcement to eradicate child prostitution without allowing "complaint
of remissness or culpable indifference"). For a discussion of inmates' Article 21
liberty rights, see Upendra Baxi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 2 S.C.C. 308, 308;
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675, 1732.
94. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 S.C.C. 416, 435-36.
95. See id. at 436 (ruling that a detainee may be permitted to meet his lawyer
during interrogation). See also Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh,
A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 991, 993; M.H. Hoskot v. Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1548,
1554.
96. See S.R. Sankaran, Criminal Justice System: A Framework for Reforms,
ECON. & POL. WKLY, May 29, 1999, at 1316, 1319 (stating that "[t]he police as an
institution cares little for the orders of the court and any aggrieved party has to
again go to the courts to seek remedy or enforcement of the orders of the courts");
Stinking Criminal Justice System, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Mar. 20, 1999, at 647.
These two articles have generated a good deal of controversy in India. See also
SATHE, supra note 69, at 306.
97. See BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 6-9 (expressing concern that the Prevention
of Terrorism Ordinance places restrictions on a detainee's access to a lawyer,
especially during interrogation).
98. See POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 32; TADA, 74 A.I.R. 1987 ACTS § 15.
POTA adopts this provision verbatim from TADA.
99. Defenders of section 32 of POTA will point to subsections 2-5 as safeguards
against police abuse. Subsection 2 provides that the detainee has the right to
remain silent. POTA 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 32(2). Subsection 3 provides that no
confession may be made under duress. Id. § 32(3). Subsections 4 and 5 provide
that once a detainee makes a confession, he must be brought within forty-eight
hours in front of a magistrate who is supposed to verify that the statement was not
coerced. Id. §§ 32(4)-(5).
100. Id. § 27.
101. Consider id., subsection 2, which states that if the accused refuses to give a
requested sample, "the Court shall draw adverse inference against the accused."
Id. § 27(2). See also BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 10-13.
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2. The Special Courts-Secret and Constitutionally
Problematic
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United
States, the U.S. government ordered the use of secret military
tribunals for certain suspected terrorists considered to be high-risk
threats, in order to protect the nation's security. 0 2 The military
order states that due to endangered U.S. safety and the nature of
terrorism, principles of law and rules of evidence applicable to U.S.
district courts will not be applicable to these military tribunals. 10 3
Little has been disclosed as to how these tribunals might operate,
but administration officials have admitted that such trials: would
be closed to public scrutiny; would have confidential times, dates,
and locations; would have no juries; would not allow defendants an
automatic right to legal representation before their trial; would be
presided over by a panel of military officials; and would provide
defendants with few if any rights to appeal. 0 4
Since the December 2001 Indian Parliament attack, the
Indian government has similarly established Special Courts to
handle cases brought under POTA,105 based on many of the same
reasons that United States officials have given in support of secret
U.S. military tribunals. However, the sheer presence of these
Special Courts highlights a main structural problem that has
plagued the Indian legal system for decades. The "regular" Indian
courts-the lower criminal and civil courts, the state High Courts,
and the Supreme Court-all face incredible case backlogs that are
arguably the worst in the world. 10 6 Relevant for our purposes here
102. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, § 4, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military
Order]. For a discussion of these recent military tribunals, see generally Neal L.
Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); John Mintz, List Created of Captives to Be
Tried by Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, May 3, 2003, at A17.
103. Military Order, supra note 102, at § 1(f).
104. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 102, at 1261-62, 1265-66; Laura Dickinson, Using
Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International
Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1415-16 (2002); Carl
Tobias, Detentions, Military Commissions, Terrorism, and Domestic Case Precedent,
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1377-79 (2003).
105. See POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS Ch. IV.
106. See Dibroy, supra note 81, at 23; Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy, supra
note 20, at 92-93; Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Bread for the Poor"
Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming
2004). See also Jayanth K. Krishnan, The Rights of the New Untouchables: A
Constitutional Analysis of HIV Jurisprudence in India, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 791 (2003)
(critically evaluating the Indian legal system and discussing the factors
contributing to these case backlogs).
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is that rather than tackling the fundamental flaws inherent in the
legal system, Indian officials for years have opted to establish
alternative judicial institutions that seek to bypass the regular
courts. 10 7  Such alternatives-like POTA's Special Courts-are
supposed to function in a superior, or at least more efficient,
manner than the regular courts.108 Yet the few empirical studies
examining the performance of alternative forums reveal that they
suffer from the same types of difficulties that plague the regular
courts-overcrowded dockets, delays, unaccountable judges,
inadequate remedies, and ultimately frustrated, dissatisfied
parties.10 9 It is too early to know whether the POTA Special
Courts will experience the same problems as these alternative
forums. What is noteworthy is that because of the prevalent belief
that fixing the regular courts would amount to a Sisyphean-like
endeavor, 10 politicians have opted to promote alternatives, like
POTA's Special Courts, to deal with legal issues thought to need
immediate attention."1
These Special Courts also raise constitutional problems.
According to section 23 of POTA, the Central Government, not the
Judiciary, has the final say in determining over which cases the
Special Courts shall have jurisdiction." 2 Amnesty International,
however, has pointed out that the Basic Principles on the
107. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 106.
108. Id.
109. Id. See Catherine S. Meschievitz & Marc Galanter, In Search of Nyaya
Panchayats: The Politics of a Moribund Institution, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 47-77 (Richard Abel ed., 1982); ROBERT S. MOOG,
WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SUPREME? ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CIVIL COURTS
IN INDIA 135-46 (1997); Robert S. Moog, Conflict and Compromise: The Politics of
Lok Adalats in Varanasi District, 25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 545, 545-65 (1991); Sarah
Leah Whitson, "Neither Fish, Nor Flesh, Nor Good Red Herring" Lok Adalats: An
Experiment in Informal Dispute Resolution in India, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 391, 400, 416-45 (1992); Gene Kassebaum, ADR in India: The Lok Adalat as
an Alternative to Court Litigation of Personal Injury and Criminal Cases in South
India 5 (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
110. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 106. One reason that reform of the
regular courts is difficult is because the Indian Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes
allow for endless appeals, resulting in cases being continued for decades or simply
never heard. In addition, the Indian bar has been resistant to any substantive
change in the judicial process. Indian lawyers tend to receive their fees on the
basis of court appearance. So there seems little incentive to change the way the
game is currently played. See Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy, supra note 20, at
100-02. A recent proposal to overhaul the Civil Procedure Code met with fierce
resistance from lawyers who demonstrated and went on strike; eventually a
watered-down version of the proposal was passed, but most observers are skeptical
that real change is on its way. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 106.
111. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 106.
112. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 23(3).
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Independence of the Judiciary, an international agreement
endorsed by the Indian Supreme Court, states that the judiciary
"shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue .. .is
within its competence."1 1 3 Moreover, the Supreme Court in L.
Chandra Kumar v. Union of India 14 settled the issue of the extent
to which parliament could remove the judiciary's right to
determine for itself the cases it could hear. The Court in Chandra
Kumar held that "the power of judicial review over legislative
action ... is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution"
and ordinarily "can never be ousted or excluded." 115 In Chandra
Kumar, Parliament had stripped the jurisdiction of state High
Courts to hear cases on appeal from an administrative tribunal-
another alternative forum established to deal more speedily with
complaints from civil servants against their particular
governmental employer. 116  Even though Parliament's statute
seemed to reiterate what an existing constitutional article
allowed, 117 the Court said that such jurisdictional stripping
violated the "basic structure" of the Constitution, the spirit of
which was to provide claimants with an opportunity to appeal
lower court (including tribunal) decisions to the upper judiciary. 118
Although POTA does not strip a convicted defendant's right to
appeal to a state High Court," 9 the key point is that it does not
allow the Special Court to determine for itself which cases it may
hear.120
Another troubling aspect is how the Special Court functions
113. See BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 10-13. See also Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary, 7th Cong. on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 Aug. to 6 Sept. 1985, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
121/22/Rev.1 at 60 (1986).
114. (1997) 3 S.C.C. 261.
115. Id. at 301. The Court specifically cites Articles 226 and 32 as vesting this
power in the High Courts and the Supreme Court respectively. Id.
116. Id. at 307.
117. See INDIA CONST. art. 323A; Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
118. (1997) 3 SCC 261, 311. The Court cited Article 226 of the Constitution,
which the Court has interpreted as allowing any claimant the opportunity to file
suit on behalf of the public in a state supreme, or High Court, when there was a
state violation of a fundamental right or a right guaranteed by statute. See id. at
302. See Kesavandana Bharti v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 292, for a discussion of
the basic structure doctrine. Yet in 2002 the Court upheld a recent amendment to
the Legal Services Authority Act, which states that any settlement reached in an
alternative dispute forum is binding and non-appealable. See S.N. Pandey v. Union
of India, Writ Petition Order 543/2002. The Pandey court, however, said nothing
about the basic structure doctrine, nor did it overturn any past precedent. See id.
119. See POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 34.
120. See id. § 32(3).
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under POTA.121 Each Special Court is run by one judge, an
appointee of the central government, who is allowed broad powers
in drawing adverse inferences against the defendant. 122  As
mentioned above, POTA does not require the police to obtain a
written informed consent waiver from the detainee before taking a
blood, DNA, or other type of bodily sample. 123 As long as the police
testify that the detainee voluntarily provided such a sample, the
evidence will be admissible in court. The potential here for
abusing a detainee's right against bodily invasion is obvious. Even
if the accused refuses to comply to a non-coercive police request,
the statute allows the court to draw an "adverse inference" against
the defendant. 124 Section 53 also allows a Special Court judge to
draw an "adverse inference" against a defendant who possesses
arms believed to have been used in a terrorist act; 125 whose
fingerprints were found at the site of such an act or on anything
used in connection with its commission; 126 or who rendered
financial assistance to a person the defendant knew was suspected
of a terrorist act. 127
Allowing such inferences against the accused has serious
ramifications for individual civil liberties. Imagine, for example, a
situation in which a person is suspected of owning a firearm that
the government thinks was used in a terrorist crime. Suppose
that the firearm has traces of blood on it, but that it was planted
in the person's home by the real terrorist. Now assume because
the accused-like many Indians-believes that the police engage
in doctoring evidence, he refuses to give a blood sample. The court
will be permitted to look askance at the accused not only for
"possessing" the firearm, but also for not submitting to the blood
test. 128 The judge may therefore view the defendant in a negative
light even before the trial begins or the defense has an opportunity
to present its case. This is an additional advantage for the
prosecution, which already benefits from the facts that POTA is
silent on the evidence required before the police can make an
arrest, and on who bears the burden of proof if the case goes to
121. See id. Ch. IV.
122. See id. § 23(4). In some cases, where the central government so approves, a
state government may appoint a Special Court judge. Id.
123. See id. § 227(1); supra note 100 and accompanying text.
124. See POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 27(2).
125. Id. § 53(1)(a).
126. Id. § 53(1)(b).
127. Id. § 53(2).
128. Id. §§ 53(1)(a), 27(2).
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trial. 129
The erosion of defendants' rights is made more perilous when
these provisions are combined with section 4 of POTA, which
makes "unauthorized possession of . . . bombs, dynamite or
hazardous explosive substances or other lethal weapons capable of
mass destruction"'130 a terrorist act itself, punishable up to life in
prison. 131 If the government claims that an individual has violated
section 4, that individual faces a seemingly irrebuttable
presumption of guilt,132 in effect stripping any adjudicatory power
from the Special Court. Moreover, the phrase "lethal weapons
capable of mass destruction"'133 is undefined by the statute and
therefore left open-ended. What constitutes- a "lethal weapon"?
Does possession of an ordinary ingredient that potentially could be
used to make a lethal weapon qualify as an offense under section
4?
Section 4 thus violates due process, one of the Constitution's
fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 to every
Indian. 134 Article 21 states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of
his [or her] life or personal liberty except according to the
procedure established by law."'135 Defenders of POTA will be quick
to point out that Article 21 contains no precise due process
language and that, in fact,. the framers of the Indian Constitution
are believed to have deliberately omitted due process language
from this provision.136 But a review of the Indian Supreme Court's
129. See POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS §§ 52 (addressing arrest), 29 (addressing
the procedure and power of Special Courts). See also BRIEFING, supra note 60, at
10-13.
130. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 4.
131. Id.
132. For commentary on this point and on how this section draws directly from
TADA, see BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 10-13.
133. See POTA, 89 A.IR. 2002 ACTS § 4.
134. See INDIA CONST. art. 21. The Indian Constitution has twenty-two parts,
twenty-plus chapters, nearly four hundred separate articles, a detailed appendix
(known as the section of schedules), and a set of directive, non-justiciable public
policy principles. See generally INDIA CONST. Embedded as well in part three of
the Constitution are fundamental rights guaranteed to every Indian. Id. Part III.
The broad categories that these fundamental rights cover include: the right to
equality, the right to freedom, the right against exploitation, the right to freedom of
religion, cultural and economic rights (including.the right to private property), and
the right to constitutional remedies. Id. See also Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Three
Models of Secular Constitutional Development: India, Israel, and the United States,
10 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1-68 (1996); GARY JEFFREY
JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA'S SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 33-36 (2003).
135. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
136. See SATHE, supra note 69, at ch. 2. See also CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS
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jurisprudence on this issue confirms that Article 21 indeed
includes a due process element. Consider the matter of A.K
Gopalan v. State of Madras,137 in which the Court ruled that even
though great deference normally would be paid to the legislature's
establishment of procedures in matters of preventive detention,
the state would not be permitted to arrest and imprison
individuals in an arbitrary fashion. 38 The Court in this case also
reaffirmed its commitment to Article 13 of the Constitution, a
separate provision which voids any law that deprives, rescinds, or
abridges an individual of his or her fundamental rights.139
Some years later, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,140 the
Supreme Court broadened its view, noting that that Article 21
contained an important procedural due process component, even if
the precise words were absent from the provision.141 According to
the Court, not only did Article 21 guarantee due process, but so did
Article 19, a provision that protects every citizen from state
infringement upon one's personal liberty. 142 Reading Articles 19
and 21 together, the Maneka Gandhi court ruled: that any person
detained or arrested has the right to offer a defense as well as a
right to be heard; that an impartial court must adjudicate the case
against the defendant in a fair, deliberate manner; and that the
tenets of natural justice-not the tenets of Parliament-serve as
the standard for which procedures used against the accused will be
judged. 143
REVOLUTION 82 (1998).
137. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
138. Id. at 42, 80-84, 92-93, 106. In this case, Mr. Gopalan was arrested under a
preventive detention statute. Id. at 32-33. He argued that the manner in which he
was arrested and detained violated the principles of natural justice inherent within
not just Article 21 but also Article 19. Id. at 33. Article 19 articulates a
fundamental right protecting freedom of speech, association, movement and the
like. INDIA CONST. art. 19. Although the Court ruled that any arbitrary behavior
by the state contravening a fundamental right violated the Constitution, the Court
refused to bring a natural justice analysis into its consideration of these articles.
A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, 101-03. It further held that so long as the statute set forth a
procedure of how people like Gopalan should be treated, then the Court would defer
to the legislature. Id. at 103.
139. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, 34. INDIA CONST. art. 31(1).
140. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.
141. Id. at 604-05.
142. Id. at 604. See INDIA CONST., art. 19. Section 1 of Article 19 states: "All
citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble
peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions; (d) to move freely
throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory
of India... [and] (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade
or business." Id. § 1. Sections 2 to 6 provide qualifications and caveats to this
article. See id. §§ 2-6.
143. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.
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Section 4 of POTA does not come close to satisfying the
Maneka Gandhi requirements. Under section 4 there is no right
to be heard, no opportunity for the accused to make his or her case,
nor any requirement for a deliberate judicial proceeding. Once the
state has charged a person under section 4, guilt attaches.
144
Unfortunately section 4 is not the only portion of POTA where
there are due process concerns.
Section 30, subsection 1 gives the Special Court discretion to
hold proceedings against the accused in camera.145 The next two
subsections of section 30 discuss how the identity of the
government's witnesses may be kept from the accused, if the
prosecution, in its motion to the Special Court, indicates that those
testifying fear for their personal security. 146  As Amnesty
International has argued, nowhere is there a "procedure to hear the
accused on this issue. [Effectively] this denies the accused the rights
adequately to prepare his or her defense, to obtain the necessary
information to challenge the witness's reliability and to examine
witnesses on the same terms as the prosecution .... ,,147
The Supreme Court on several occasions has made it clear
that a fundamental aspect of a fair trial includes the ability of the
defendant to mount a vigorous defense that includes the right to
challenge those making the accusations. 148 As Professor S.P.
Sathe has argued, the right of a defendant to know the basis of his
or her accuser's claims is inherent within the liberty and
procedural guarantees of Article 21.149 Denying the accused an
opportunity to raise objections to the in camera or witness secrecy
provisions also contravenes principles found in international
protocols such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,150 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 151 the Body
144. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 4.
145. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 30(1). See also BRIEFING, supra note 60, at
12.
146. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS §§ 30(2), (3). See also BRIEFING, supra note 60,
at 13.
147. BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 13.
148. For a series of cases that highlight the importance that the Court has placed
on the defendant's right to prepare a zealous legal defense, see: Suk Das v. Union
Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 991; Khatri v. State of Bihar,
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 928; Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1369,
1377; Ranchod Mathur Wasawa v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1143.
149. See generally S.P. SATHE, THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1991).
150. See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 14
(1966), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm (last visited
Jan. 28, 2004). See also BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 13.
151. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, art. 9-11 (1948) available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. See also BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 13.
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of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, 152 and the U.N.'s Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime Abuse and Power.1 53
POTA's opponents fear that its Special Courts will serve as a
rubberstamp for the executive branch, as the TADA Special Courts
were accused of doing during the 1980s and 1990s.15 4 There is also
another problem with having such non-independent courts operate
within this environment. Earlier I noted that police brutality is
frequent in India. Physical beatings, sexual assault, and
deprivation of basic human needs are documented atrocities that
the police are commonly known to inflict on inmates.155 If the
authorities indeed are arresting potential terrorist suspects and
the Special Courts are imprisoning these people based on pure
allegation, then there is a good possibility that at least some of
those in custody are being abused by the police. Gaining
information on the status of these detainees and the government's
overall implementation of the anti-terrorist legislation has not
been easy. However, some data have come to light. The next
section will explore how the government has used POTA in its war
on terrorism, and how the courts have adjudicated various POTA-
based prosecutions over the past two years.
IV. Government Use and Court Adjudication of POTA
A. Review Committees and POTA's Judicial Statistics
In the United States, there has been a recent debate
concerning the best way to enforce the PATRIOT Act. Some have
argued that because the problems that the PATRIOT Act attempts
to address are so pervasive, law enforcement authorities at all
levels of government should be working to accomplish the statute's
goals. 15 6 This position inevitably raises Tenth Amendment and
152. See generally BODY OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL PERSONS
UNDER ANY FORM OF DETENTION OR IMPRISONMENT (1988), available at
http://www.nchre.org/readingroom/undocuments/bpil.shtml. See also BRIEFING,
supra note 60, at 13.
153. See generally DECLARATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS
OF CRIME ABUSE AND POWER (1985), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/i9dbpjv.htm; BRIEFING, supra note 60.
154. See Gautam Navlakha, POTA- Freedom to Terrorise, ECON. & POL. WKLY.,
July 19, 2002, at 3039. See also Hard Law, supra note 14, at 1066.
155. See supra notes 86, 93 and accompanying text.
156. See Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy after September 11, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1115, 1118-19 (2002) (citing Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership
Act of 2001, S. 1615, 107th Cong. (2001)). See also Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration
Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling after
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federalism concerns. Since immigration policy and immigration
enforcement in the United States have fallen traditionally within
the scope of the federal government, opponents contend that
federal authorities should be exclusively responsible for
administering the PATRIOT Act.157 Any attempt by the federal
government to deputize state and local police in order to enforce
this new law infringes upon state sovereignty, and drains state
resources that could be used for other purposes.15 8
India, too, is a federalist system, but because of the historic
strength of its central government, there is a presumption that
police within the various states will enforce POTA.159 State police
routinely carry out other types of laws passed by the central
government, particularly in the criminal law area, where there has
long been a national penal code that governs the entire country. 160
Indian states are also expected to contribute to law enforcement
efforts because resources are scarce. 161 The problem, however, is
the persistent distrust of state police officers. With local law
enforcement continuing to play a key role in executing POTA,
there is a question as to how legitimately the statute will be
perceived, especially by minority groups. 162
In terms of administering POTA, defendants' rights are
supposed to be protected by a national review committee in charge
September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1199 n.66 (2002).
157. Ashar, supra note 156, at 1197. For an insightful study examining this
issue, see Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution
(forthcoming FLA. ST. L. REV.); see generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET
AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: POLICY AND PROCESS (5th ed., 2003).
158. See ALEINIKOFF ETAL., supra note 157, at 177-89.
159. See generally K.L. BHATIA, FEDERALISM AND FRICTIONS IN CENTRE-STATE
RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF INDIAN AND GERMAN CONSTITUTIONS
(2001); K.D. GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY (2002); O.P. TIWARI,
FEDERALISM AND CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS IN INDIA: TOWARDS A NEW ERA OF
MUTUAL COOPERATION (1996).
160. See sources cited supra note 159.
161. See sources cited supra note 159. As in the United States, state legislatures
in India can tighten the standards set forth by the central government, as long as
no conflict arises between the state's statute and the central government's statute.
See, e.g., P.D. SHARMA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION: THE RELAY RACE FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 56-57 (1998) (noting, however, that state legislation generally
doesn't depart much from the parameters set by the central government).
162. See J. Venkatesan, POTA Ordinance Empowers Review Committees, HINDU,
Oct. 28, 2003, available at http://
www.thehindu.com/2003/10/29/stories/2003102908090100.htm (quoting renowned
civil rights lawyer Fali Nariman, who states that "[t]he problem lies with the
States. Therefore don't give them the power of arrest under POTA .... [Tierrorism
is a Central [government] subject and not a mere law and order problem").
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of overseeing enforcement and adjudication of POTA cases. 163
Each state also maintains its own review committee, which does
the bulk of the day-to-day oversight work; each of these state
committees answers to the national committee. 164 On October 28,
2003, amendments were added to POTA in order to give the
national and state committees greater teeth 165 in performing their
mission. State committees now have the power to decide whether
the police have a prima facie case against a detainee before the
matter can even go before a Special Court.1 66 The amendments
give the national review committee the additional power of
reviewing and reversing state committee decisions. 167
Yet there is a question as to what type of real access accused
individuals have to this review committee process. The
amendments state that any action by the review committee,
whether at the state or national level, will only be triggered upon
"an application by any aggrieved person."'16 This presumes that
someone arrested under POTA knows about this requirement.
Because detainees have limited access to legal representation,169
many will never learn of the review process option during the
police interrogation phase of the investigation.
The data compiled by the central government's review
committee reveals that since March 2002, 1,600 arrest warrants
have been issued for people under POTA. 170 Of the 1,600, 514
people are currently detained in jail while 885 remain at large.171
(It is unclear as to the status of the remaining 261 persons.172) To
date, the government reports that only 39 people have pursued
complaints173 through the review committee process. 174 Because
"complaint" is not defined, it is impossible to tell from this
information if pursuing a complaint means that the accused is
163. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 60.
164. Id.
165. See Venkatesan, supra note 162.
166. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 60(4).
167. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS, §§ 60(5), (6).
168. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS, § 60 (4).
169. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
170. See J. Venkatesan, No POTA Application in 15 States, 6 UTs, HINDU, Oct. 1,
2003, http://www.thehindu.com/2003/10/02/stories/2003100204331 100.htm
[hereinafter No POTA].
171. Id.
172. Id. (providing no explanation for this missing data).
173. Id.
174. Id. (noting that "the maximum number of complaints to the Central Review
Committee is from Tamil Nadu (23); Delhi (5); Maharashtra (6); Uttar Pradesh (3);
and Jharkhand (2)").
20041
Law and Inequality
inquiring whether the government has made its prima facie case,
or whether it means that the accused has filed an independent
complaint against the government for some other reason.
Assuming it is the former, the fact that only 39 out of 514
detainees (7%) are making use of the 2003 amendments, seems to
undercut the government's repeated claim that POTA contains
safeguards to ensure that a defendant's rights are protected.
POTA arrests have also been spread unevenly through India.
The 1,600 arrest warrants have been filed in only ten of India's
twenty-nine states and six union territories.175 Why the police
have not pursued POTA charges in the majority of the states is an
open question. Perhaps there have been no suspected terrorists in
these states. Or, the police may have insufficient evidence for an
arrest. Alternatively, it may be that in other states the leadership
and/or the police have strategically avoided making POTA an issue
for political reasons. These speculations require empirical
verification. But the next section will demonstrate that, with
respect to the last point, when the government has opted to bring
POTA charges against an individual, many people inevitably
assume that politics has a played a major role in this decision.
B. Prosecuting POTA Cases-Questionable Political
Motiuations
At the time of this writing, the Indian government reports
that 301 POTA cases are currently being pursued in the various
Special Courts throughout the country.' 76 But given the secret
manner under which most people are arrested, questioned,
detained, and tried, it has been difficult to collect information on
the exact nature of the cases being brought by the government.
However, through some matters involving prominent defendants,
we have learned that the government's actions leave much to be
desired. For instance, in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, a
political enemy of the Chief Minister 177 and head of a major
opposition party known as the MDMK,178 is currently being
prosecuted under POTA. The accused, Mr. Vaiko, is charged with
violating section 21, which prohibits the promotion of any terrorist
175. See id. (noting that the states in which arrest warrants have been filed are
Andra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir,
Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh). See CENSUS
OF INDIA, at http://www.censusindia.net (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
176. See No POTA, supra note 170.
177. The current Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu is Mrs. Selvi J. Jayalalitha, who
is the head of the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam).
178. MDMK stands for Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam.
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group explicitly banned by the statute. 7 9 According to the state
government, on June 29, 2002, Vaiko gave a speech in which he
allegedly stated, "I was, I am, and I will continue to be a supporter
of the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]."180 Vaiko is also
believed to have associated with individuals alleged to be LTTE
sympathizers. s1 The Indian government has categorized the
LTTE as a terrorist group because this organization was behind
the 1991 assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 8 2 In
addition, the LTTE has engaged in a twenty-plus year civil war
against the Sinhalese-Buddhist government of Sri Lanka, a
government that from time to time has received financial and
military support from the Indians. 183
For over a year, Vaiko languished in prison waiting for his
case to move forward. 8 4 Eventually, in February 2004, he was
released on bail, but his case is still pending. 185 There is the
possibility that Vaiko indeed conspired with this outlawed
organization for terrorist purposes, but it is difficult to believe that
politics have played no role in the arrest. As already stated, the
rivalry between Vaiko's party and the Tamil Nadu government
has a bitter history. 8 6  Furthermore, until he was formally
charged, Vaiko sat as a member of the lower house of the national
Parliament (the Lok Sabha). Although he and his party initially
supported the BJP's position regarding POTA, 8 7 Vaiko began
speaking out against POTA after it became law. 8 8 Since his
179. Vaiko Episode Shows POTA is a Political Weapon, MILLI GAZETTE, July 15,
2002, http:lwww.milligazette.com/Archives/1507200211507200235.htm [hereinafter
Vaiko Episode].
180. Id.
181. See V. Venkatesan, POTA and Some Dilemmas, FRONTLINE, Aug. 3-16,
2002, at 28.
182. Under POTA the LTTE is listed as the twenty-first banned group in the
section entitled "Schedule." For a discussion of Rajiv Gandhi and his assassination,
see generally SUNIL KHILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA (1997); VED MEHTA, RAJIV
GANDHI AND RAMA'S KINGDOM (1994); SHASHI AHLUWALIA & MEENAKSHI
AHLUWALIA, ASSASSINATION OF RAJIv GANDHI (1991).
183. For a discussion Sri Lankan civil war, see generally ROBERT ROTBERG,
CREATING PEACE IN SRI LANKA: CIVIL WAR AND RECONCILATION (1999).
184. See Jayaraj Sivan, After 16 Months in Prison, Vaiko Rues the Day He
Supported POTA, INDIAN EXPRESS, Nov. 5, 2003,
http://www.indianexpress.comfull-story.php?contentid=34729.
185. Rediff News Serv., TN Govt Challenges Vaiko's Bail, Feb. 9, 2004, at
http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/09vaiko.htm.
186. For an insightful discussion of Tamil Nadu politics, see NARENDRA
SUBRAMANIAN, ETHNICITY & POPULIST MOBILIZATION: POLITICAL PARTIES,
CITIZENS, & DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH INDIA 82-129 (1999).
187. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text. See also Venkatesan, supra
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arrest, the BJP has maintained a conspicuous distance from
Vaiko's case, contending that it is an internal state matter for the
Tamil Nadu police to handle.18 9 Neither the prosecution nor the
state police has disclosed any link between Vaiko's supposed
comments and his ties to the terrorist underworld. Authorities
have also repeatedly failed to answer why Vaiko's actions are not
protected under the Constitution's guarantees of freedom of speech
and freedom of association.190 In April 2003, Vaiko petitioned the
Supreme Court to declare section 21 of POTA as unconstitutional
on these grounds. In December 2003, a two-judge panel of the
Court refused to grant his release and upheld the validity of
section 21, but it did rule that Special Courts could not find an
individual guilty of violating this section for expressing "moral
support" alone for a terrorist group. 191
Thus, the strategy of seeking relief from a higher court may
have some limited merit. In another recent high profile POTA
case, four alleged Muslim extremists were accused of plotting the
December 2001 attack on Parliament. In a startling decision, the
Delhi High Court reversed the Special Court convictions of two of
note 181, at 28.
189. See Vaiko Episode, supra note 179.
190. See INDIA CONST. art. 19.
191. Although the court did hold that if the prosecution could prove that there
was "intent" to support the LTTE, then Vaiko could be found guilty. PUCL v.
Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of 2002 with W.P. (Crl.) 89 and 129/2002
and 28 and 48/2003. See also POTA is Constitutional Rules SC, Dec. 16, 2003, at
http://www.indlawnews.com/News/Archive/ViewNewsDetail.asp?result=d724f97088
04a62eedc9c2786d15b4e4.xml. See also Bhatnagar, supra note 92. For nearly
three decades the Indian Supreme Court has allowed claimants directly to petition
it in matters where the central government is accused of infringing upon the
fundamental rights of the Constitution. The Court has allowed such petitions
under Article 32 of the Constitution. For relevant case law, see S.P. Gupta v.
Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149; D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987
S.C. 579; Ratlam Municipal Council v. Vardhichand, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1622;
Fertilizer Corporation v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344; People's Union for
Democratic Rights v. Union of India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473. The Court also has held
that Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution prevent legislative attempts to
limit the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, 311. The Court also held that Article
226 of the Constitution gives any claimant the opportunity to file suit on behalf of
the public in a state supreme, or High Court, when there is a state violation of a
fundamental right or a right guaranteed by statute. See id. at 302. See T.C.
Basappa v. T. Nagappa A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 440, 443, 447 (describing in dicta the
general parameters of the High Courts' and Supreme Court's authority to issue
writs of certiorari, but ultimately holding that the writ in the case at bar had been
improperly issued by the High Court). See PUCL Urges Supreme Court to Quash
POTA, TIMES OF INDIA, Apr. 03, 2003, http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Law/2003/poto-sc-
pucl.htm. See also POTA Court Denies Bail to 8 MDMK Partymen, TAJA NEWS,
Sept. 11, 2003, http://www.tajanews.com/noqnews/nnqview.php?ArtlD=2214.
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the main accused perpetrators. 192 Shortly after the Parliament
attack, the police arrested Shaukat Hussain Guru and Mohammad
Afzal, two men accused of belonging to the banned terrorist group
Jaish-e-Mohammed. 193 According to police, both men implicated
two other individuals as being integral conspirators in the
Parliament attack-S.A.R. Geelani, a lecturer at Delhi University,
and Afsan Guru, the wife of Shaukat Hussain Guru. 194 A Special
Court in Delhi hearing the case found the three men guilty of
violating section 3, subdivision 2 of POTA as well as the Indian
Penal Code's murder statute, section 302, and sentenced them to
death. 195 The court also ruled that Afsan Guru was guilty of
concealing knowledge of the conspiracy and sentenced her to five
years in prison and a fine of 10,000 rupees.
196
All four defendants appealed their cases to the Delhi High
Court. The Delhi Court sustained the verdicts against Shaukat
Hussain Guru and Mohammad Afzal, although in January 2004,
the Supreme Court issued a temporary stay of the execution
orders until it could more fully review the matter. 97  The
convictions of Professor Geelani and Afsan Guru, however, were
thrown out by the Delhi Court. 98 The Dehli Police have since
petitioned the Supreme Court, challenging the acquittals, 199 and
the Supreme Court will be reviewing the Delhi Court's dismissal of
these two cases in 2004.200 In its reversal, the Delhi Court ruled
that the statements of the two co-defendants to the police
implicating Geelani and Afsan Guru should not have been used as
192. Siddharth Narrain, Reversing a Verdict, FRONTLINE, Nov. 8-21, 2003,
available at http://www.flonnet.com/fl2023/stories/20031121005002000.htm.
193. Id. See also Geelani Made a Scapegoat: Amnesty International, MILLI
GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 2002, at
http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15092002/1509200261.htm.
194. Narrain, supra note 192.
195. POTA, 89 A.I.R. 2002 ACTS § 3(2) (describing the punishment for
committing a terrorist act); INDIAN PEN. CODE § 302. Because the special courts
are held in camera, no evidence is available as to how the defendants were deemed
to have violated section 3, subd. 2 of POTA.
196. State v. Mohd. Afzal and Others, Murder Reference No. 1/2003; Crl. A. No.
43/2003; Along with Crl. A. Nos. 59 and 80/2003; Along with Crl. A. Nos. 12, 19 and
36/2003. See also Narrain, supra note 192; Geelani Made a Scapegoat, supra note
193.
197. See SC Stays Death Penalty on Shaukat, Afzal, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 19,
2004, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.comarticleshow/432433.cms [hereinafter SC
Stays Death Penalty].
198. State v. Mohd. Afzal and Others, Murder Reference No. 1/2003.
199. Geelani, Guru's Acquittal Challenged in SC, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 14, 2003,
at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/357229.cms.
200. SC Stays Death Penalty, supra note 197.
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evidence at trial.20 1 Even though section 32 of POTA allows the
government to present at trial the confessions made by an accused
to the police,20 2 the High Court followed the long-standing
principle of Indian evidence law that precludes the prosecution
from using uncorroborated statements. 203  For the court, the
incriminating statements against Geelani and Afsan Guru were
self-serving and did not provide "cogent" proof that Geelani and
Afsan participated in the conspiracy. 20 4 The Delhi High Court also
opted to scrutinize other evidence presented at trial, in particular
the police recording of a phone conversation between Geelani and
his half-brother that supposedly included Geelani praising the
Muslim assault on Parliament.20 5 The court found no proof for this
and went on to conclude that neither Geelani nor Afsan Guru
showed any indication of having involvement in the December
2001 plot.20 6
The Delhi High Court's decision highlights that in at least
one type of case the judiciary will not grant per se deference to the
government in POTA cases. But the state has vowed to appeal the
decision to the Supreme Court. If precedent is any indication, this
may be a very wise move, for the reason that the Supreme Court
has tended to show great deference to the procedures contained
within POTA in the few cases that have come before it. In
addition to its December 2003 Vaiko ruling, the Court held in
September 2003 that before a defendant charged under POTA
could ask for bail from the upper courts, his motion needed to be
adjudicated in a POTA Special Court.20 7  In this case, four
Muslims had been arrested under POTA for starting the 2002
Hindu-Muslim riots in the state of Gujarat that left thousands of
people (the vast majority of whom were Muslims) displaced,
brutalized, or dead.208 Before a Special Court could be convened,
201. State v. Mohd. Afzal and Others, Murder Reference No. 1/2003.
202. Id.
203. Id. See also BRIEFING, supra note 60, at 12.
204. State v. Mohd. Afzal and Others, Murder Reference No. 1/2003.
205. Id.
206. Id. The issue regarding the tapping of the phone conversation made its way
up to the Supreme Court as a separate interlocutory appeal. The Court ruled that
indeed the phone conversation could be considered as evidence, evaluated by the
Special Court. The Court then remanded the matter, and while the Special Court
considered it as adverse evidence against the defendants, the Delhi High Court
reversed. See State v. Navjot Sandhu, Afsan Guru and Others, 2003 2 L.R.I. 690,
33.
207. State of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh and Others, 2003 Indlaw
SC 708, 15.
208. There have been hundreds of news stories published on the riots. For a
selected sample, see HUM. RTS. WATCH, COMPOUNDING INJUSTICE: THE
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the defendants moved to be released on bail, but a regular
criminal court denied their request. 209 On appeal, the state High
Court ruled that a bail motion could be entertained by the regular
courts. 210 However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument,
deferring to POTA's language that in these types of cases bail first
must be considered by a Special Court. 211
In another similar judgment, the Supreme Court reversed
the Tamil Nadu High Court's ruling that bail should be granted to
journalist R.R. Gopal, who was arrested in April 2003, for
possessing terrorist weapons and other materials prohibited by
POTA.212 As in the case of Mr. Vaiko, 213 Gopal contended that his
arrest and prosecution were motivated by politics. 21 4 Gopal argued
that because he published stories critical of and embarrassing to
members of the Tamil Nadu government, the state retaliated
against him. 21 5 In overturning the state High Court's ruling, the
Supreme Court again deferred to POTA's provisions on bail: that
when the prosecution opposes a bail request, a court may grant
bail only when there has been an abuse of discretion on the part of
the government. 216 In Gopal's case, the Supreme Court ruled that
a prima facie case indeed existed, and that the state High Court
should not have allowed its sympathy for the defendant's
argument to cloud what was an obviously easy call to deny bail.217
Deriding the state court justices for their lack of logic, the
GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO REDRESS MASSACRES IN GUJARAT, July 2003,
http://www.hrw.org/asia/india.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2004); Rediff News Serv.,
The Gujarat Riots Homepage, at http://www.rediff.comlnews/godhra.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2004).
209. For a procedural history of this case see, Rediff News Serv., Godhra: SC
Reserves Verdict on Gujarat Appeal, Sept. 1, 2003, at
http:llwww.rediff.comlnews/2003/sep/Olgodhra.htm; Legal Correspondent, Bail
Blow to Godhra Accused, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 9, 2003, at
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030909/asp/nation/story-2347560.asp.
210. Bail Blow to Godhra Accused, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 9, 2003, at
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030909/asp/nation/story_2347560.asp.
211. See State of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh and Others, 2003
Indlaw SC 708, 7 15. The Court refers to POTA section 3, subdivisions 2 and 3,
and section 34, subdivision 1 in its ruling. Id. at 7 4.
212. State of Tamil Nadu v. R.R. Gopal Nakkeeran Gopal, 2003 Indlaw SC 800,
IT 7, 16-17.
213. See supra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
214. For background on this case, see Nakkeeran Editor Gopal's Bail Cancelled,
INDO-ASLAN NEWS SERV., Sept. 26, 2003, at
http://in.news.yahoo.com/030926/43/281qd.html.
215. Id.
216. See State of Tamil Nadu v. R.R. Gopal Nakkeeran Gopal, 2003 Indlaw SC
800, 7 4. The Court cites section 4; section 49, subdivision 6; and section 49,
subdivision 7 of POTA in its ruling. Id. at IT 4, 14.
217. Id. at 7 14-17.
2004]
Law and Inequality
Supreme Court concluded that the state "High Court does not
seem to have applied its mind to this aspect at all."2 18
Beyond the courts, another institution is also charged with
monitoring the government's use of POTA. The National Human
Rights Commission (NHRC) is a proclaimed independent
governmental body established in 1993.219 It is statutorily charged
with ensuring that every individual's constitutional rights are
protected by the Indian state.220 The NHRC is empowered to
depose witnesses, conduct discovery, evaluate evidence, issue
reports and recommendations, and ask the central government
and the judiciary to enforce its opinions. 221 There are currently
eight positions on the NHRC: four Members, three Ex-officio
Members, and a Chairperson. 222 The NHRC is chaired by former
Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court, A.S. Anand. 223
The NHRC has, at times, criticized the central government
and various state governments for not doing more to protect
human rights.224 Perhaps the most well-known report from the
NHRC involves the above-mentioned 2002 Gujarat riots.225 In the
months after the riots, the state and central governments
launched investigations; the NHRC conducted its own
investigation, as did numerous domestic and international non-
governmental associations. 226 In its report, the NHRC noted that
the police had not adequately protected Muslim communities that
came under attack.227 It also noted that political leaders and the
media contributed to the problems by politicizing the riots and
fanning religious tensions. 228 And when several Hindus accused of
218. Id. at 16.
219. The NHRC was established by Parliament through the Protection of Human
Rights Act (PHRA) of 1993, 81 A.I.R. 1994 ACTS.
220. Id.
221. Id. at ch. 3.
222. Id. at ch. 2.
223. See NHRC's official website, at http://www.nhrc.nic.in (last visited Feb. 24,
2004).
224. Id.
225. NAT'L HuM. RTs. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE VISIT OF NHRC TEAM HEADED BY
CHAIRPERSON, NHRC TO AHMEDABAD, VADODRA AND GODHRA FROM 19-22 MARCH
2002, Mar. 31, 2002, http://nhrc.nic.in/gujannexl.htm [hereinafter NHRC
REPORT].
226. See, e.g., id. Some of the NGO's that have done in-depth investigations on
the riots include, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the People's Union
for Civil Liberties, to name a few.
227. See NHRC REPORT, supra note 225. See also J. Venkatesan, NHRC Chief
Deplores Tardy Relief to Gujarat Riot Victims, HINDU, Jan. 10, 2003,
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/01/10/stories/2003011004671 100.htm.
228. See NHRC REPORT, supra note 225. See also HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note
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murdering a group of Muslims at the Best Bakery Shop were
acquitted after key eyewitnesses during the trial recanted what
they originally said they saw,229 the NHRC intervened and asked
the Supreme Court to investigate whether the defendants should
be re-tried outside of Gujarat and whether those charged had
intimidated the witnesses.230 The investigation is still pending.231
Even though the NHRC claims to be an autonomous
institution, it is still a governmental body that operates with a
ruling Hindu-nationalist party in the background. After the riots,
Gujarat police arrested hundreds of Muslims and charged them
with violating POTA. 232 Most of these individuals remain in
custody, while according to Human Rights Watch, not one Hindu
has been charged under POTA.23 3  Interestingly, the current
NHRC Chairman has commented that while POTA has some
defects, it still is a much better statute than its predecessor
(TADA). He claims that it has not been misused for political
purposes, at least during his tenure. 234 In July 2003, I interviewed
an official from the NHRC hoping to learn more about what the
Commission was doing to protect the rights of Muslims in
Gujarat.235 I specifically wondered why neither the state nor the
central government had used POTA to charge the thousands of
Hindus believed to have participated in the 2002 massacres. Also,
why had the NHRC not taken note of this disparity? Was this not
208.
229. See Rediff News Serv., Gujarat Riots: All 21 Accused in Vadodara's Best
Bakery Carnage Acquitted, June 27, 2003, at
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/j un/27guj.htm.
230. See Rediff News Serv., NHRC Pans Best Bakery Acquittals, July 2, 2003, at
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jul/02guj.htm.
231. Indlaw News Serv., Trial Court Proceedings In Gujarat Riot Cases Stayed,
Nov. 21, 2003, at www.scjudgments.com. Although note, in April 2004 the
Supreme Court ruled that the accused be re-tried outside of Gujarat in the state of
Maharashtra. See Gov't to abide by SC Order in Best Bakery Case, TIMES OF INDIA,
Apr. 14, 2004, http://wwwl.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/616706.cms.
Whether this change of venue will make a substantive difference in how justice is
administered remains to be seen.
232. See HUM. RTs. WATCH, supra note 208.
233. Id. See also Special Correspondent, Illegal Detention of Muslims in Gujarat:
Amnesty, HINDU, Nov. 7, 2003,
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2003/11/07/stories/2003110702351200.htm.
234. See Rediff News Serv., More Safeguards Needed in Anti-Terror Law, Feb.
22, 2003, at http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/feb/22nhrc.htm (noting that during a
news conference Anand "denied that the act was being misused for political
reasons").
235. Interview with NHRC official who asked to remain anonymous, July 29,
2003 (on file with the author) (interview done as part of a mission for Minnesota
Advocates for Human Rights, an NGO investigating the Gujarat riots) [Hereinafter
Interview with NHRC official].
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disparate treatment of a minority community by both the Gujarat
and central government and thus a direct violation of the
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause?236 The official stated that
it would not be possible to comment on my questions at this time
and recommended that I review the NHRC's website and
publications if I wished to pursue this matter.237
This NHRC official may have had valid reasons for refusing
to provide answers to these queries. But for those who look to the
NHRC to protect the rights of minorities and the disadvantaged,
this silence is worrisome. Even the moderately conservative
national newspaper, The Hindu, has suggested that the NHRC's
lack of condemnation for how POTA has been discriminately used
in Gujarat places this body's legitimacy into question. 238 As a
recent editorial notes, although the NHRC opposed POTO when it
was a bill in Parliament, the NHRC has done little to prevent the
politicization of POTA since it has become law. Instead it has
passed the responsibility over to the Supreme Court to decide on
the legality of governmental action under the statute.239
Both the NHRC and the Supreme Court will soon be dealing
with more POTA cases. It is difficult to predict how either
institution will respond to future charges that a state or the
central government is abusing its powers under this law. If the
actions exhibited thus far by the NHRC and the Court provide
even the slightest clue, then POTA will remain an important
governmental weapon in the fight against terrorism for many
years to come.
Concluding Remarks
India passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act in the months
following the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, but
the influence of its legislative precedent can be seen in various
provisions of the current law. POTA's comprehensive measures
enhance both the states' and central government's police powers to
deal with real and perceived threats of terrorism. The question
posed in this piece is to what extent have civil liberties been
compromised as a result of the central government's desire to
236. INDIA CONST. art. 14.
237. Interview with NHRC official, supra note 235.
238. Editorial, On the Ground in Gujarat, HINDU, Oct. 26, 2003, available at
http:llwww.hindu.comI2003t10/26/stories/2003102600081400.htm.
239. Id. For a discussion on the NHRC's stance on POTA, see Rajeev Dhavan,
Sugarcoating POTA, HINDU, Oct. 31, 2003, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/31/stories/2003103100841000.htm.
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protect the nation from terrorist attacks.
In evaluating the different aspects of POTA, I have explained
how various individual rights have been curtailed since the
passage of this law. Because of the broad manner in which it is
written, POTA has been (and no doubt will continue to be)
challenged on a number of constitutional grounds. For instance,
the statute infringes upon the individual's constitutional rights to
freedom of expression and freedom of association. 240 POTA also
obstructs detainees from proper legal representation, the right to
confront accusers, the right to a fair bail hearing, and the right to
have an open, publicly scrutinized trial.241 Furthermore, POTA's
creation of Special Courts to adjudicate terrorist prosecutions, 242
and the law's irrebuttable presumptions of guilt for certain
statutory violations, 243 place into real question the government's
claim that it is concerned for individual rights.
Even in the present politically tense environment, there is
some hope that other institutions will serve as checks on how a
state or the central government administers POTA. However, the
two bodies that carry legitimacy among the public, the NHRC and
the Supreme Court, have not yet directly challenged how POTA
has been used. In addition, in April 2003, a separate and
supposedly independent (albeit government-established)
commission studying the criminal justice system released a two-
volume report that endorsed the current ruling party's anti-
terrorism policies. 244 This report not only criticized the numerous
advantages historically possessed by defendants in criminal trials,
but it also recommended that Parliament incorporate into the
Indian Penal Code the above-discussed provisions of POTA.245
240. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 145-153 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 105-144 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
244. Justice V.S. Malimath, a former chief justice of the Karnatka and Kerala
state High Courts, authored the report and chaired what has become known as the
Malimath Commission. The Commission was made up of six members. See
AMNESTY INT'L, INDIA: REPORT OF THE MALIMATH COMMIrrTEE ON REFORMS OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SOME OBSERVATIONS (2003), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200252003?open&of=ENG-IND (last
visited Feb. 24, 2004).
245. Id. at Part I. POTA is currently set to expire in October 2004. Id. For this
reason, the Commission has stated that rather than having to re-enact the
legislation every so many years, it would be best if Parliament simply incorporated
POTA into the ordinary criminal law. Id. Among some of the 158
recommendations made by the Malimath Commission are: that the police be given
wider latitude in interrogating witnesses; that establishing proof beyond a
reasonable doubt be lowered to a less "unreasonable" standard; and that a
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Opposition political parties, most notably the Congress Party,
have been very critical of POTA, accusing the BJP government of
using this law to crush dissenting opinion. Yet one wonders
whether the Congress Party would have acted any differently if it
had been in power during the December 2001 attacks on
Parliament. After all, it was the Congress Party that pushed for
passage of the draconian TADA following the assassination of
Congress Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984.246 Perhaps the
only hope is for grassroots non-governmental organizations to
continue pressing for respect for individual rights. Until those in
power who are using POTA offer a stronger defense for their anti-
terrorist actions, bottom-up pressure may be the best chance for
promoting and ensuring governmental accountability in the
world's largest democracy.
defendant's right against self-incrimination be viewed adversely by the court. Id.
The introduction of the report, written by Professor Upendra Baxi is very critical of
the Malimath Commission's final recommendations. Id. at Foreword. Also critical
have been various lawyers, non-governmental associations, and opposition political
parties.
246. See Shunmugasundaram, supra note 13. After Mrs. Gandhi's assassination,
thousands of Sikhs were murdered in the streets of Delhi, while the Congress Party
in power did little to quell the rampage. Some members of Congress were even
active participants in leading the riots. To this day, not one Congress party official
has been held accountable for even one Sikh death. Many writers have
documented this tragedy. See, e.g., Naunidhi Kaur, Acquittal of a Politician,
FRONTLINE, Jan. 18-31, 2003, available at
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl200l/stories/20030117004312000.htm; Naunidhi
Kaur, Waiting for Justice, FRONTLINE, Sept. 1-14, 2001, available at
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1818/18180340.htm. See also, CHRISTOPHER
SHACKLE ET AL., SIKH RELIGION, CULTURE AND ETHNICITY 188-98 (1998).
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